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LEGAL FORMALISM
AND INSTRUMENTALISMA PATHOLOGICAL STUDY
David Lyonst
Holmes and those who followed in his wake believed they were
rejecting a rigid and impoverished conception of the law (often called
"formalism") which had, in their view, adversely affected judicial
practice. They spawned a collection of doctrines that Professor Summers dubs "pragmatic instrumentalism" '-fittingly so-called both
because they viewed the law as an eminently practical instrument and
because they were so strongly influenced by the philosophical pragmatists William James and John Dewey.
This essay has two parts. The first and longer part identifies and
examines the basic doctrines of formalism and instrumentalism. The
arguments offered by instrumentalists against formalism suggest that
both schools generally agree on two fundamental points. First, the law
is rooted in authoritative sources, such as legislative and judicial
decisions (a "source-based" view of law). Second, legal judgments
that are justifiable on the basis of existing law can be displayed as the
conclusions of valid deductive syllogisms the major premises of which
are tied very tightly to the authoritative texts (a "formalistic model"
for legal justifications). The difference between the schools concerns
the question of whether law is complete and univocal. Formalists are
understood to argue that existing law provides a sufficient basis for
deciding all cases that arise. This belief, in combination with the
formalistic model for legal justifications, leads the formalists to conclude that the authoritative texts are logically sufficient to decide all
cases. In denying this, instrumentalists appear to have the better of
the argument. I shall go further, however, to argue that the formalistic
model for legal justifications, which is shared by formalists and instrumentalists alike, is subject to serious question.
The second part of this essay examines criticisms by instrumentalists of "formalistic" judicial practice. I argue that these criticisms
appear ill-founded and that the doctrines of formalism provide little, if
t Professor of Law and Philosophy, Cornell University. A.B. 1960, Brooklyn College;
M.A., Ph. D. 1963, Harvard University.
I Summers, Pragmatic-Instrumentalismin Twentieth Century American Legal Thought-A Synthesis and Critique of Our Dominant General Theory About Law and Its Use, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 861
(1981). Professor Summers's Article is assumed here as a guide to these doctrines.
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any, basis for the sort of practice to which instrumentalists have
objected.

FORMALISM AND INSTRUMENTALISM COMPARED

A. Legal Formalism
Legal formalism is difficult to define because, so far as I can tell,
no one ever developed and defended a systematic body of doctrines
that would answer to that name. We have no clear notion of what
underlying philosophical ideas might motivate its conception of the
law. It is sometimes tempting to suppose that there has never been
any such thing as a formalistic theory of law, but only pregnant
pronouncements by some legal writers which lack any coherence or
theoretical foundation, combined with judicial practices that are
thought (soundly or unsoundly) to embody the attitudes of those
writers. Although the instrumentalists were distressed by a variety of
judicial and juristic errors, their reactions must be our principal guide
to formalism.
Part of what is meant by formalism is this: The law provides
sufficient basis for deciding any case that arises. There are no "gaps"
within the law, and there is but one sound legal decision for each case.
The law is complete and univocal. According to Summers, formalists
hold that law is "traceable to an authoritative source." '2 This leads
one to inquire, however, about what counts as an authoritative
source. One must assume that authoritative sources include legislative
and judicial decisions or authoritative records of them. But what else
might they comprise?
The question is crucial because some of those who have been
called formalists have also been understood to argue that law is determined not just by such mundane human actions and decisions, but
also by what is sometimes called "natural law." Natural law has
never been laid down as law in any ordinary way, so far as our
ordinary legal records show. One jurist who suggests this view is
William Blackstone, who, although sometimes called a formalist, 3
wrote in his Commentaries that "no human laws are of any validity, if
contrary to [the law of nature that is dictated by God]; and such of

2 Id. at 867 n.4, item 6.

' See Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71
(1958).

HARV.

L. REV. 593, 610
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them as are valid derive all their force and all their authority, medi4
ately or immediately, from this original."
Blackstone's position is usually understood as follows: Nothing
counts as law unless it derives from, or at least accords with, God's
dictates. If we assume that Blackstone was a formalist and that formalists believe law is complete, then we must understand him as arguing
that human law is not only rectified by divine command but also
completed by it. In other words, some of our law comes only from
extraordinary authoritative sources. This last point is important because it suggests the shape formalism might have to take in order to
secure the formalists' claim that law is complete, without surrendering
any of their other fundamental claims. Because formalism is assumed
to tie law very closely to authoritative sources, the class of sources
must be expanded into the supernatural realm in order to supply
sufficient law to close all the gaps left by authoritative, mundane
sources.
The idea of a "natural law that is dictated by God" functions in
theories like Blackstone's as a specific conception of a more general
concept which an atheist, for example, would interpret differently:
that of "moral law." Blackstone thus suggested the more general view
(which exposed him to biting comments from Bentham and others)
that nothing counts as law unless it is morally acceptable, and there is
as much law as morality requires. Law is not only thought to have
moral sources but is regarded as morally infallible as well. The instrumentalists, however, knew better than that.
This reading of Blackstone stresses a kind of authority at the base
of law and, hence, might be credited as formalism. Despite the possibility of such an interpretation, I think we should follow Summers,
who I take it conceives of a "source-based" conception of law in
narrower and more mundane terms, excluding the supernatural. This
renders formalism more plausible and more deserving of serious critical attention. Straw men impede the progress of legal theory.
This understanding of formalism is compatible with Blackstone's
remarks on another, more faithful reading. Blackstone can be understood to say not that morally objectionable law does not exist, but
rather that there is no automatic moral obligation to obey it. "Natural
law" is relevant to determine when ordinary human law "binds in
conscience." This is not an uncommon view among natural lawyers.
It was developed most clearly by Aquinas, 5 who argued that human
1 W.
s 2 T.

1945).
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laws are either just or unjust, and that one has an obligation to obey
just laws, but not all unjust laws. Human laws are unjust when they
fail to serve the common good, when they exceed the lawmaker's
authority, when they distribute burdens unfairly, or when they show
disrespect for God. One is morally bound to obey such an unjust law
only when circumstances demand it, in order to prevent scandal or
disturbance.
If we understand Blackstone (who was not so clear) along the
lines suggested by Aquinas, then Blackstone may be interpreted as
saying that "natural law" provides a standard for determining when
human law merits our obedience. Under this sympathetic interpretation, Blackstone could be credited with an ordinary source-based view
of law. Thus, he would qualify as a formalist-provided, of course,
that he also espoused certain other doctrines, to which we now turn.
Our sketch of formalism amounts so far to this: First, the law is
rooted in authoritative sources, like legislative and judicial decisions;
second, it is complete and univocal. But what makes it "formalistic"?
That label turns on a third doctrine-namely, that law decides cases
in a logically "mechanical" manner. In other words, sound legal
decisions can be justified as the conclusions of valid deductive syllogisms. Because law is believed to be complete and univocal, all cases
that arise can in principle be decided in this way. This is theformalistic
model for legal justifications. These three doctrines capture the essence
of formalism when it is viewed as a type of legal theory.6 They do
not, however, explain what may be called the "formalistic method"
in judicial practice, which will be discussed below.
B. Instrumentalism
Ironically, it is more difficult to pin down the doctrines of instrumentalism, because this school of legal thought is determined by the
writings of a variety of jurists. They do not always agree and, indeed,
are not always self-consistent. Consider, for example, the instrumentalists' attitudes towards what Summers calls "valid law." 7 One
finds three views in unhappy aggregation. Summers claims that instrumentalists share with formalists a source-based conception of law,
but that they also embrace the predictive theory. Some instrumentalists, however-the radical fringe on the edge of legal realism-are
"rule skeptics." The rule skeptics claim that real law consists only of

6

Moreover, they seem to cover all of Summers's twelve points. See Summers, supra note

1, at 867 n.4.
7 Id. at 896.
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past judicial decisions, which are understood as limited to their specific holdings, without any further binding implications. No two of
these views are compatible.
What is a "source-based" view of law? Presumably, it means
that courts are bound by certain authoritative texts or decisions. If the
relevant texts or decisions are entirely neglected, judicial decisions or
their justifications are that much in error. Authoritative sources establish legal limits or constraints upon judicial decisions. This is not to
say they are sufficient to determine a uniquely correct decision in each
case or that they must be applied syllogistically. Instead, they must be
given their due weight, however that is to be understood.
Rule skepticism clearly does not square with a source-based view
of law, for it implies not just that judges are liable to decide cases as
they please, but that they are legally free to do so. Furthermore, the
idea that laws are "predictions" of what courts will probably decide
sits well with neither of these other instrumentalist notions of law. The
prediction theory is advanced as a conception of law that goes beyond
past decisions. It is meant to perform a task that rule skepticism
avoids, but it cannot possibly do that job. A prediction of judicial
decisions is not the sort of thing that can bind a court; it cannot serve
as a normative standard with which a judge might or might not
comply. If a decision accords with a prediction, it may confirm the
prediction, but it does not demonstrate that the decision is legally
sound. The fact that a decision falsifies a prediction is in no way
indicative of judicial error.
Radical rule skepticism can be understood as a way of trying to
cope with a puzzling legal phenomenon. If a court acts when existing
law seems to provide insufficient guidance, its capacity to help shape
the law may not be puzzling. A court's departure from the literal
reading of a statute or from a binding precedent, however, may be
puzzling if its decision effectively establishes new legal doctrine. It
may seem as if one cannot account for the efficacy of such decisions
except by holding that all law actually is made by courts. Courts
themselves cannot be seen as laying down general standards, however,
for this would only introduce the same problem all over again. Hence,
the logical extension of this argument is rule skepticism, which claims
that there never is any determinate law aside from specific holdings in
past cases.
The question is whether it is more reasonable to conclude that
(1) there are legally binding standards from which courts can sometimes effectively depart, even if they do so erroneously, or (2) there
are no legally binding standards, which excludes the possibility of
judicial error. The following observations may be useful. To acknowl-
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edge the possibility of judicial error is to assume neither that law
provides a unique answer to every legal question nor that when law
provides one, it does so with logical conclusiveness, excluding all
argument to the contrary. Judicial error may be the failure to follow
the best legal arguments or the strongest legal reasons, as is usually
assumed when judicial decisions are criticized on one legal ground or
another. Furthermore, one who believes that courts can err is not
committed to the view that such cases have no effect on the law. One
might believe that judicial decisions pronouncing new legal doctrines
do not always succeed in entrenching those doctrines into the law.
Such entrenchment occurs when subsequent courts follow the decision. A novel decision, however, is not always followed-not even by
the same court. If a court fails to follow its own previous decision,
then, according to the radical realist, it has nothing to explain. The
court cannot be regarded as changing either the law or its interpretation of the law, because that would imply that there is law beyond
specific holdings. The opposing view maintains that a court might fail
to follow its own previous decision either by mistake or because it
believes it made an error that it wishes to rectify. This seems to fit our
usual ways of thinking when we are not spinning theories about the
law, and it is incumbent on legal theories to account for any divergence from these legal phenomena. It may also be admitted, however,
that it is incumbent on the opposing theorist to explain how and when
judicial mistakes become entrenched within the law.
Despite the excesses of its skepticism, the theory of the radical
realists represents a clearer and more consistent overal legal philosophy than its instrumentalist competitors. It can be understood as
suggesting that a judicial decision is justified when, but only when, it
serves (perhaps to the maximum degree possible) the interests of those
who will be affected by the decision. Although many other instrumentalists endorse this normative theory, their views are inconsistent with
it, because they believe that past legislative and judicial decisions
serve as constraints upon the decisions that can be justified in a
particular case. Thus, these nonradical instrumentalists are committed both to the view that courts are bound by past legislative and
judicial decisions and that they are not so bound. Their official normative theory does not conform to their understanding that courts are
bound by other authoritative decisions. One cannot consistently
maintain that those past decisions must have some influence on the
decision in the present case-that they provide authoritative standards to be followed-while arguing that the case at hand must be
decided solely by consideration of the likely consequences.
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To see what is wrong with the normative theory of radical realism, one must ask what would make it right. Two conditions must be
satisfied. First, there must be no basis for supposing that past legislative and judicial decisions are properly regarded as binding. Second,
the proper basis for judicial decisions must be simple, direct utilitarianism. Hence, we must ask why others assume that past legislative
and judicial decisions properly guide judicial decisions.
One nonutilitarian explanation is that judges have morally committed themselves to being bound by such decisions and to deciding
cases in light of whatever law there is. They have accepted this public
trust, as everyone understands. This is not necessarily an absolute
obligation; one can find examples in which deciding a case according
to the law conflicts with a judge's more salient nonjudicial obligations.
The judicial obligation of fidelity to law is limited in other ways as
well. It is conditional upon being voluntarily undertaken; a judge
coerced into serving on the bench under a brutally corrupt regime is,
if bound at all, not bound in the way that judges are ordinarily bound
by the public trust they willingly assume. Furthermore, there may be
limits on the moral scope of such obligations. Just as it makes perfectly
good sense to hold that soldiers in wartime are not legally or morally
bound by certain orders-such as those clearly and openly intended to
have the soldiers commit atrocities-so it makes perfectly good sense
to hold that some law may be so morally corrupt as to lie outside the
limits of a judge's obligation of fidelity to law.
For such reasons, we might infer that the law must satisfy some
moral minimum if judges are to be regarded as bound by past legislative and judicial decisions. The procedures must satisfy minimal conditions of fairness, the outcomes must satisfy minimal constraints of
justice, or both. Without such assumptions, the idea that judges are
"bound" to follow the law or that judges are expected to render
"justifiable" decisions is unintelligible. We merely play misleading
and possibly pernicious games with serious and important ideas like
obligation and justification unless we suppose that they are linked
significantly to factors such as those we have just listed. The alternative is a mindless sort of authority-.worship-the notion that mere
"legal" authority (in the narrowest sense), which is compatible with
the worst sorts of abominations the world has suffered under law, is
somehow capable of creating a real "obligation" and is capable of
"justifying" what it does to innocent victims. Legal positivists sometimes seem to employ such a desiccated conception of "legal" authority, obligation, right, and justification, though they truly have no
need for it. The upshot is confusion about the relations between law
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and morals. Just as we need not suppose that law and morals are
completely divorced in order to recognize that law is morally fallible,
we need not suppose that law automatically possesses any genuine
authority in order to analyze its structure, systematize its restrictions,
or appreciate that it is something to contend with in practice.
It is reasonable to suppose that the more moderate instrumentalists make such relevant assumptions about the law they see themselves
as bound by and that such considerations explain why past legislative
and judicial decisions bind courts and limit the scope of their decisionmaking power. As Summers observes, 8 nonradical instrumentalists
seem to accept a source-based view of law, as do all instrumentalist
judges in practice, whatever they may say when writing about the law.
C. Moderate Instrumentalism and Formalism Compared
How do these moderate instrumentalists diverge from formalism?
Surprisingly, not by very much. They too have a source-based view of
law, which distinguishes them from the radical realists. They reject,
however, the "formalistic" notion that law is complete and univocal.
Unlike the radical realists, the moderate instrumentalists believe that
there are laws between the gaps; unlike the formalists, they believe
that there are gaps between the laws.
This does not address the third aspect of formalism-the formalistic model for legal justifications. It is tempting to suppose that
instrumentalists reject this doctrine as well; after all, they attribute
much less significance to the role of formal logic in the law than do the
formalists. It is worth asking, however, what is meant by the instrumentalists' complaints about the formalists' excessive use of formal
logic. One factor that complicates matters is that these issues are
sometimes framed in terms of the logical character of "judicial reasoning." But "judicial reasoning" is ambiguous; it can refer to the
logical relations between premises and conclusions, or it can refer to
the thought processes of judges. The former is something logicians
study, while the latter is a field for psychologists. Although psychologists concerned with the logical character of thought processes require
training in logic, logicians need no training in psychology. Claims
about the role, or lack thereof, of formal logic in judicial reasoning are
correspondingly ambiguous. One who has a formalistic conception of
logic, or of legal justifications in particular, assumes that all good
arguments are deductive. One who has a formalistic conception of
thought processes, or of judicial thinking in particular, assumes that
8 Id. at 900.
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our thoughts run along deductive lines. These ideas are quite independent. One might deny, for example, that judges' thought processes always proceed along straight deductive paths before they arrive
at a tentative decision, yet believe that sound judicial decisions can be
presented as the conclusions of valid deductive syllogisms with true
legal propositions as the major premises and factual assumptions as
the minor premises. Thus, an instrumentalist who maintains that
formalists have exaggerated the role of logic in adjudication might
simply mean that judicial thoughts do not run along syllogistic lines.
This point is innocent enough, but it is often misunderstood. It is
sometimes suggested, for example, that if judicial thought processes
are not syllogistic, then later presenting the corresponding judicial
opinion in syllogistic form is hypocritical and involves some form of
rationalization (in the pejorative sense). The recognition that judicial
thought is not always shaped by syllogistic reasoning may lead to the
conclusion that formal logic has no real role in "judicial reasoning."
But this would be mistaken. Entertaining hypotheses in a variety of
ways is compatible with the justification by rigorous argument of
those that survive systematic criticism, and this combination is indispensable as well as routine in all spheres of inquiry and all respectable
disciplines. Indeed, it is sometimes a virtue for judicial thought to be
relatively unfettered, but the justified decision must take account of all
relevant considerations, verify the premises adopted, and include only
sound reasoning. If opinions generally did that, we should have no
instrumentalist complaints of excess logic.
Another factor that complicates the instrumentalists' attitudes
towards formal logic is their emphasis on factual considerations in
judicial decisions. Their innocent and innocuous point is that law
applies to cases only in relation to factual assumptions that are made.
In other words, law's actual implications for cases depend on the facts,
while its de facto applications depend on presumed facts. The determination of the facts, however, cannot be solely a matter of deductive
reasoning. The basis for the latter claim is the familiar point that
factual statements about what has happened or is likely to happen in
the natural world are always established by evidence that is logically
insufficient to entail those statements. This does not reflect badly on
logic, but is merely a symptom of two phenomena. First, empirical
conclusions logically outstrip the evidence that confirms them. Second, the confirmation of empirical conclusions is therefore necessarily
nondeductive. This is hardly central to legal theory, and formalists are
without reason to deny it. Moreover, it concerns the preliminary
arguments needed to establish factual premises used in the justifications of judicial decisions. It should be emphasized that formalists
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cannot be understood to deny that factual considerations play a decisive role in legal decisions. No one in his right mind believes that law
dictates decisions in particular cases independently of the facts; one
cannot even classify a case without making factual assumptions about
what goes on in the world. Formalists assume that facts need to be
established in order to justify judicial decisions. Their idea that legal
justifications are deductive concerns the arguments for judicial conclusions only after factual premises have been established.
Even after consideration of these elementary points, something
clearly remains of the instrumentalists' concern about formalism's
dependence on logic. They seem to argue that formalists make a
pretense of deducing decisions from the law when the law does not, in
fact, support those deductions. Alternatively, formalists are deluded
by their theory into thinking that they can rely solely on law, and they
stretch the law in order to do so. But concepts are not so precise and
legal norms are not so wide as to cover every case that does arise.
According to instrumentalists, there are gaps within the law that
formalists do not recognize.
This is not only a complaint about "formalistic" adjudication,
but also a reflection of the differences in legal theory previously
discussed. It is partly definitive of formalism that it regards law as
complete and univocal, and partly definitive of instrumentalism that it
regards the law as, at best, incomplete. This brings us back to the
differences between formalism and instrumentalism, which first led us
into this thicket of logical theory. Now that we have emerged from the
undergrowth, what can we say about the third aspect of formalistic
theory? Do instrumentalists reject the formalistic model of legal justification, as their complaints about formalism's excess use of logic might
lead one to suspect?
The instrumentalists might be interpreted to maintain that deductive, syllogistic argument is fine, as far as it goes. Unfortunately, it
won't take us far enough to reach the conclusion that formalists
desire-namely, that law is complete and univocal. The law, instrumentalists would say, simply does not extend so far. If we are faithful
to the texts provided by the authoritative sources, we find that they
are vague and sometimes conflicting, subject to alternative interpretations, and therefore incapable of supporting logically adequate, conclusive arguments for judicial decisions in all cases.
There is some reason to interpret instrumentalist criticism in this
way, even though it commits the instrumentalists to questionable
philosophical assumptions. One reason is that these assumptions are
quite commonly made, especially within "tough-minded" legal theory, such as instrumentalists claim to possess. This interpretation also
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makes moderate instrumentalism parallel to legal positivism, just as
philosophical pragmatism, which seems to underlie instrumentalism,
is parallel to the traditional empiricism that seems to underlie positivism.
The general picture of these two theories we then get may be
stated as follows. Moderate instrumentalists and positivists alike embrace a source-based conception of the law as well as a formalistic
model for legal justification; partly because of this combination, they
reject the formalistic notion that law is complete and univocal. Instrumentalists, like positivists, emphasize that because the interpretation
of authoritative legal texts and their application to cases are often
controversial, reasonable arguments are often possible on both sides of
a legal issue. Since there are no hard and fast rules for adjudicating
such disputes, positivists conclude that law in such cases is indeterminate-not yet fully formed, needing judicial legislation. Instrumentalists most likely have a similar view of the law. They assume that law is
determinate on an issue at a given time only if its identification and
application are, roughly speaking, mechanical. Hence, law is gappy
and incomplete, and judicial discretion must be exercised and law
created in hard cases. Thus, rather than rejecting the formalistic
model of legal justification, they merely insist on its limitations.
This sort of view is so widely accepted today that it is important
to understand its presuppositions and limitations. The instrumentalists make the decisive assumption that law is not determinate if it is
controversial, for law is thought to be gappy and indeterminate only
when reasonable legal arguments are possible on both sides of a legal
question. That occurs, however, just when the content of law is
controversial-when competent lawyers can reasonably disagree
about it. It relates to the formalistic model of legal justification in the
following way: When law is controversial in the sense that reasonable
legal arguments are possible on both sides of a point of law, then the
law cannot be identified and interpreted mechanically by means of
deductive, syllogistic arguments. Considerations must be weighed on
both sides of the issue, and there is no rule fixing how that must be
done. Hence, deductive logic cannot govern the justificatory arguments that are then made.
This reasoning exposes a more fundamental assumption of formalism, instrumentalism, and positivism: Nondeductive reasoning is
incapable of adequately establishing any conclusion. Perhaps the assumption should instead be articulated as follows. If, in principle, it is
impossible to prove a proposition by presenting it as the conclusion of
a sound deductive argument-that is, where true premises absolutely
entail the conclusion-then there is no such fact as the one ostensibly
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represented by the proposition. Taken as a general claim, this is either
an idle philosophical prejudice or else represents very radical doubt
about the possibility of knowledge. For, as we have already observed,
the most respectable conclusions of the "hardest" of the sciences
always logically outstrip the evidence and other considerations used to
establish them. Such conclusions are never decisively proven in a
logically water-tight manner. Therefore, when we claim to know what
they assert, it is conceivable that we are mistaken. The view under
consideration takes this to imply that in such cases there is no natural
fact corresponding to the scientific conclusion. It is not that we are
liable to be mistaken, but that there is nothing to be mistaken about.
This reading of instrumentalism is supported by the similarity
between its underlying philosophical empiricism and the philosophical
views that appear to underlie legal positivism. Empiricism can be
understood to claim that what we can know about the world must be
discovered by the use of our ordinary senses. But both British Empiricism, which is the dominant influence behind legal positivism, and
American philosophical pragmatism generally assume a particular
version of this theory that regards what goes on in the world as
ultimately "reducible" to "hard" observable facts by means of rigorous entailments or deductive logical relations. Applied to physics,
for example, this version of empiricism has led some philosophers to
maintain that there "are" no sub-atomic particles such as electrons,
at least not in the full-blooded sense in which there "are" particle
accelerators such as synchrotrons. This is so because only the latter
are perceived "directly." Therefore, sub-atomic particles have no
more substance than the physical evidence for them, such as configurations on a photographic plate taken from a cloud chamber.
This version of empiricism is compatible with a source-based
conception of law combined with a formalistic model for legal justifications. The "hard data" are the authoritative texts and their literal
implications. The "four corners" of such texts, stretched only to
include their most literal implications, represent the limits of real,
determinate law. All the rest is mere "theory."
D. Does Law Go Beyond the Texts?
If the preceding discussion is accurate, formalism and instrumentalism share two out of three central doctrines, and we can account for
the instrumentalists' contention that formalism stretches the law to
create implications where no clear implications can honestly be found.
Given their mutual assumptions, the instrumentalists seem to have
the superior position. If we conceive of law as so thoroughly determined by authoritative texts, as both schools of legal thought appear
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to do, it seems implausible to suppose that law is complete and
univocal, for the texts are not collectively univocal, and are often
unclear.
We need not rest on the above assumptions, however; instead,
we need to ask why we should conceive of law in such a way. Perhaps
it is inescapable. After all, the texts are taken as authoritative, and the
texts admittedly have somewhat uncertain implications. But we can
move too quickly here. We cannot derive such significant conclusions
about law from such innocent facts about texts unless we make certain
assumptions about what law is. In other words, we can jump from the
verbal limits of authoritative texts (such as statutes and records of
judicial decisions) to the gappiness of law only if we assume that law is
fundamentally a linguistic entity, that law is exhausted by the formulations
of such texts and their literal implications.
This assumption may be questioned once it is identified. After
all, the law is not just a collection of words. Why must we limit
ourselves to thinking about the substantive content of the law in terms
of its authoritative words and their literal implications? The obvious
explanation is that law is a human artifact, fashioned with words like
those in the authoritative texts. The words are not the beginning and
end of the law-law is a social institution, too-but they represent its
normative content. Whatever content the law has, it has because of
what we have put into it.
It is important to recognize that this theory represents not just a
source-based conception of the law, but one that is bound by the
formalistic model for legal justification. Its general appeal rests to
some extent on the tacit assumption that nondeductive arguments are
somehow suspect, so that we cannot derive law from authoritative
texts using anything but literal readings and strict implications. This
opinion hardly comports with our most respected intellectual practices
outside the law, but doubt about the theory need not rest entirely on
such analogies.
The question we must face is whether it is reasonable to maintain
that law goes beyond the authoritative texts and their strictly deduced
implications. The following argument suggests that this position is
tenable.' The point is not to establish an alternative conception of the
law, but rather to show that alternative conceptions are feasible and
that the doctrines we have found embedded in both formalism and
instrumentalism are themselves just theories about the law which are
neither self-evident nor self-certifying, but require substantial justification.
'

This argument is adapted from R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-37 (1978).
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One need not unqualifiedly endorse the following argument to
recognize its point. It involves what are sometimes called "vague
standards" in the law. The due process clause is an example. Calling
it a "vague standard" suggests that the due process clause is mainly
an empty vessel waiting to be filled with doctrines supplied by covertly
legislative activities of courts. This is the view I wish to challenge. In
so doing, I shall ignore the complication that decisions based on the
clause today must take into account past judicial treatments of it. The
point of ignoring such authoritative interpretations is that it provides
the central reading around which other factors must be understood to
turn. For example, it may be customary to read the due process clause
in terms of the "intentions" of the Framers. This would have to be
acknowledged in any final decision about how to interpret and apply
the clause today. That particular approach, however, is to be considered here only as a direct reading of the clause itself. The due process
clause is most naturally read to prohibit the government from doing
certain things to a person in the absence of fair procedures. Once this
is agreed, we can focus on the requirement of fair procedures.
Why should we think the due process clause vague? Perhaps
because it does not tell us what is fair. The criteria of fairness are not
to be found within the four corners of the text, nor can they be
inferred from it. We must go beyond the text to determine what the
clause prohibits, if indeed it can be understood to prohibit anythingif it is determinate enough to do that.
One thing is certain. The clause concerns fairness, not something
else, such as economic efficiency. That it requires faii" procedures is all
but explicit-what else could "due process" mean? Only a wild
theory could support the claim that the clause requires procedures to
be economically efficient. Hence, the clause must have some meaning-at least enough to tell us what it is about, thus excluding some
other possibilities.
Let us pursue the analogy with economic efficiency. Imagine a
law that requires some activity to be "economically efficient" without
defining economic efficiency. How could a court apply it? First, the
text would have to be understood as assuming that there is such a
thing as economic efficiency; that it makes sense to suppose that
certain activities are economically efficient and that some are not; that
some judgments about efficiency are true and others are false; and
that criteria of efficiency are determinable in principle, at least in
specific contexts. A court applying such a requirement must therefore
identify appropriate criteria of economic efficiency. It will soon discover that there are alternative conceptions of efficiency; it must
weigh the relative merits of those alternative conceptions as well as
their relevance to the specific context at hand. It must then proceed on
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the assumption that in each context, some conception is most appropriate. But the court might find this assumption indefensible. It might
find that there is absolutely no reason to prefer one specific conception
of efficiency to another in the particular context. If so, assuming the
two equally tenable conceptions are not practically equivalent, the
court must make an arbitrary selection.
Suppose, however, that did not happen. Suppose the court concludes that some specific conception of economic efficiency is the most
appropriate, at least for the specific context in question. It must then
attach that conception to the law, providing the law with more content
than it had originally, but not so that it would be legislating freely.
That is, if there really are reasons for preferring one conception of
economic efficiency to others in a given context, the assumption of the
law in question would be true; if the court correctly identifies and
applies that conception, it is simply carrying out its legal mandate. It
would be faithful to the text, but it would not be limited to the four
corners of the text and its literal implications.
To reach a preferred interpretation, the court must consider
economic theory. If economic theory provides a correct answer to the
court's question, it cannot be arrived at mechanically. Therefore, the
court's justificatory argument for its interpretation cannot be mechanical. This leads us to the main point of the argument: A judicial
decision need not be limited to the words of the authoritative texts and
their literal implications in order to be based firmly on those sources.
Moreover, a court could make a mistake in such a case. If, in a
given case, a single best criterion of economic efficiency exists, but the
court instead adopts another, its reading of the law would be mistaken, for it would have incorrectly applied the economic efficiency
requirement. There is, however, nothing problematic in the idea that
even the highest court within a jurisdiction can make a legal mistake
(or so we must agree if we do not swallow the most extreme rule
skepticism of the radical realists).
Let us return to the due process clause example. Just as a court in
the preceding hypothetical would have to defend a particular conception of economic efficiency, a court applying the due process clause
must defend a particular conception of fairness suitable to the case in
order to ensure fidelity to the clear meaning of the text at hand. No
such conception, no principle of fairness, is implicit in the clause. But
it does not follow that a court that goes beyond the four corners of the
text and its literal implications is not doing precisely what the Constitution requires-no more, and no less.
If the due process clause requires that certain procedures be fair,
courts cannot adhere to it if there is no such thing as a fair procedure.
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It makes no sense to require that procedures be fair unless one believes that such procedures exist-that is a presupposition of the
clause. The only plausible reading of the clause, judging from the
text, is that this is what the Framers must have assumed. Anyone who
takes seriously the task of applying that part of the law must share this
assumption.
One could not follow the law literally if its presupposition were
false-that is, if there were no such thing as a fair procedure. We are
in no position, however, to assume that there is no such thing as a fair
procedure. We seem quite capable of distinguishing clearly fair procedures from clearly unfair procedures. It may be difficult to articulate
fully the criteria by which we make such judgments, but much has
been written on the subject, and one could begin there for help.
Some theorists profess to believe that there is really no such thing
as a fair procedure because moral judgments are inherently, inescapably, unavoidably, and irremediably arbitrary. It is not just that
people can easily make mistakes in this area, or that people tend to
"rationalize" their prejudices in the pejorative sense. Instead, the
very distinction between sound and unsound moral judgments is
untenable. Such thought represents the most radical kind of moral
skepticism.
Some instrumentalists have flirted with this notion, though it
hardly comports with their own notions of what judges ought or ought
not to do, which they present as defensible. In any event, radical
moral skepticism seems an unsuitable attitude for a judge, because it
requires both cynicism and hypocrisy. It is questionable what significance a moral skeptic can attach to an undertaking of fidelity to law or
to the idea that a judge must justify his judgments. Of course, most if
not all of those who regard themselves as "tough-minded" moral
skeptics limit this to abstract theoretical pronouncements, which are
dissociated from their reasoned use of moral concepts in other contexts
and their acceptance of responsibilities.
If we do not approach the due process clause encumbered by the
burdens of moral skepticism, how must we understand it? The general
approach is clear: One must defend a particular conception of fairness
and apply it. One might get it right and then be faithful to the law, not
only in aspiration but also in decision. Alternatively, a court might get
it wrong because it has committed a significant error of moral theory.
Assuming that there is a right answer to the moral question, there is a
correct reading of the clause. This reading is faithful to the text even
though it is not limited by the four corners of the document and the
literal implications of the text. Because such an answer could not be
arrived at by deducing it from fixed premises, a court's justificatory
argument for its interpretation of the clause cannot be mechanical.
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This method of understanding the due process clause and other
"vague standards" may be contrasted with two others. One is to
assume that the clause must be understood in terms of certain examples of fair and unfair procedures that the Framers accepted or would
have been prepared to accept upon reflection. Another is to interpret
it in terms of current popular conceptions of fair procedures. There
may, of course, be good reasons for adopting such approaches to
understanding legal provisions. One must recognize, however, that if
the due process clause literally requires fair procedures, then these
approaches are theory-laden in very significant ways. Adopting either
approach involves either a departure from the text or a theory of what
fair procedures are or how they can be determined.
Take the latter case. The due process clause requires that certain
procedures be fair. To apply it by asking what procedures the Framers
would have considered "fair" requires the assumption that fair procedures are whatever the Framers believed them to be. To apply it by
asking what procedures would popularly be credited as fair amounts
to the assumption that fair procedures are whatever popular opinion
suggests they are. Such criteria of fairness are implausible. The due
process clause assumes that there is such a thing as fairness; this is not
the same as some particular individuals' conception of fairness, which
might be mistaken. We therefore cannot use one of these approaches
to such a clause without a powerful theory to support it.
The original approach suggested, which involves the application
of an appropriate conception of justice, does not avoid theory. It
proposes that courts must engage in theoretical deliberations in order
to be faithful to the text and carry out its legal mandate. If that is
right, then a source-based conception of the law does not commit one
to the formalistic model of legal justification; it is, in fact, incompatible with that narrow view of legal reasoning. It follows that the
formalistic model, which seems fundamental to both formalism and
instrumentalism, is untenable. What the law has to say about a legal
matter is not limited to the literal reading of and strict deductions
from authoritative texts. Only a radical moral skeptic can avoid this
conclusion, but such a skeptic would have no clear understanding of
judicial responsibilities.
Finally, consider the issue of completeness-the one that seems
most directly to divide this pair of legal theories. We have no clear
idea why formalism regards law as complete, but we do have some
idea about instrumentalism's opposite conclusion. So far as instrumentalism regards the law as gappy because it interprets legal sources
by means of a formalistic model, its conclusion is unwarranted. If law
is incomplete, it is not simply because we must go beyond the texts.
For the law sometimes mandates, in effect, that we go beyond the text
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not only to find the facts, but also to unveil those further considerations that help make up the law on a particular subject.
II
INSTRUMENTALISM AND JUDICIAL PRACTICE

One of the preoccupations of instrumentalists has been judicial
practice. According to Summers, "their critique of formalist legal
method may be their most important single achievement." ' 0 I shall
conclude with a brief review of this critique and its relations to theoretical doctrines like those we have discussed.
Summers mentions several charges of judicial malpractice that
instrumentalists lay at the door of formalists. They abuse logic, overgeneralize case law, artificially distinguish cases, introduce legal fictions instead of facing up to the need for judicial legislation, and fail to
decide cases in light of community policy." These charges have
varying connections with general theory- connections that the instrumentalists appear to have exaggerated. Several, but not all, seem
related to differences of doctrine. If we are correct that formalists
believe the law provides a complete decision procedure, while instrumentalists deny it, then this disagreement underlies some of the
charges of judicial malpractice. For instrumentalists believe there is
sometimes insufficient legal basis for decisions when judges they regard as formalists purport to find such bases in the law. Thus, it is
natural to expect the instrumentalists' criticism that formalistic judges
overgeneralize case law and otherwise overextend the law by introducing fictions and ignoring community policy.
The latter point reminds us that instrumentalists embrace a particular normative theory, which they do not always balance successfully against their acknowledgement of existing law. If instrumentalists believe that decisions unsupported by existing law should be made
in light of community policy, then they have two bases for disagreement with judges who decide cases differently. First, others may
believe that the law provides sufficient basis for deciding cases that
instrumentalists believe require judicial legislation. Second, they may
believe that grounds other than community policy legitimate decisions
that the law does not adequately determine. Instrumentalists, with a
naive utilitarian outlook, seem to assume that no other normative
theory is rationally tenable-all other views reflect either a disguised
10 Summers, supra note 1, at 909.
11 Id. at 910-13.
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consideration of the consequences of decisions on the interests of those
affected, or some superstitious form of valuation. Such an attitude,
however, leads inexorably to the extreme realism of the radical fringe
of instrumentalism, because it leaves no room for the notion that past
legislative and judicial decisions demand some measure of respect
even if their guidance is not optimific. To insist on maximum promotion of satisfactions and on deference to past authoritative decisions
only when that deference could reasonably be expected to have such
optimific consequences is to deny that courts are bound in the slightest
degree by statutes or precedent. One cannot have it both ways; one
must either go with the radical realists or drop such naive utilitarianism. But if naive utilitarianism is surrendered, the charge of failure to
decide cases in light of community policy is limited to cases in which
the law provides insufficient basis for decision. "Community policy"
thus becomes shorthand for "whatever standards are properly applied
in such a case." Hence, the issue between formalists and instrumentalists reduces once again to that of completeness or incompleteness in
the law. The question thus becomes whether and when the law provides no basis for decision, and what standards then properly apply.
Instrumentalistic criticism of "formalist legal method" sometimes does reflect theoretical disagreement, but not always very
clearly. For example, consider, in light of Summers's imaginary example, 12 the criticism that formalistic judges "abuse logic." The
majority of a court holds that a child cannot collect damages from
negligent individuals as compensation for injuries received during its
period in utero. The court's argument is elegant: (1) this child had no
rights that could have been violated, because (2) the capacity to
possess legal rights presupposes the capacity to have legal duties, and
(3) an unborn child cannot have legal duties. The instrumentalist
judge argues in dissent that (4) an unborn child can have legal rights
without legal duties, because (5) "we as judges can alter these concepts as we desire to serve useful goals"; 13 since there was a negligently caused injury, room can and must be made within the law for
compensation through civil liability.
Before we examine the specific charge that logic is "abused" by
the majority's decision, we should note that if we take these arguments at face value, they agree that the law speaks clearly about this
particular case. The majority supports its decision with an argument
that the dissenter does not dispute. Instead, the dissenter advocates chang-

12
13

Id. at 910-11.
Id. at 910.
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ing the law. There is no need to "alter" the relevant legal concepts
unless they lead to a decision that the dissenter believes should not be
reached. Therefore, at least on the surface, the disagreement concerns
whether to change the law by judicial legislation. Before addressing
this issue, let us analyze these opinions more closely.
The majority claims that capacity for legal rights presupposes
capacity for legal duties, which it characterizes as a kind of "symmetry." This is supposed to represent a "formalistic" attitude, because
formalists are supposed to prize such aesthetic values and read the law
as embodying them. 1 4 That sounds silly; perhaps we can make it
seem a bit more plausible.
First, formalists are supposed to regard the law as complete. If, as
we have argued, this means going beyond the authoritative texts and
their literal implications, it must involve elaboration of the law on the
basis of some theory of how to understand it. Constraints that any
such theory would have to respect include precisely those that Summers mentions, namely "coherence, harmony, and consistency with
existing law."' 5 However law is read beyond the four corners of the
texts, as an elementary matter of theory-construction it must respect
those texts and develop systematically. In other words, these values
are not vices but virtues once it is agreed that law extends beyond the
four corners of the texts. Unfortunately, this way of working out the
implications of the law does not adapt itself to the formalistic model
for legal justifications. Formal logic alone will not generate such
theory-based extensions of the texts. Therefore, logic must be abused
if it is made to serve the illusion that the texts can be so stretched.
Second, the alleged symmetry exemplified in the majority's second claim is a familiar extension of a real symmetry embedded in
normative systems. It is often asserted that rights and duties (or
obligations) are "correlative," and there are cases in which this appears undeniable. 6 If Alex owes Basil five dollars, then (1) Basil has
a right to payment of five dollars from or on behalf of Alex and
(2) Alex has a duty (is under an obligation) to pay Basil five dollars.
The corresponding right and duty are two sides of a single normative
relation; they stand or fall together. Thus, it is plausible to claim that
some pairs of rights and duties are logical or conceptual correlatives,
and it would not be misleading to refer to this as a kind of "symmetry" in the law.

Id.
Id. at 867 n.4, item 5.
16 This idea is discussed in Lyons, The Correlativiy of Rights and Duties, 4 Nous 45 (1970).
14
'5
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But not all alleged relations between rights and duties are like
that. It may be contended, for example, that Alex himself cannot have
rights without duties, in the sense that one has no valid claim against
others unless one respects others' claims on one. Alex cannot legitimately claim any rights unless he lives up to his obligations and
responsibilities. This could be characterized as a kind of "symmetry,"
but it is significantly different from the one discussed above. This sort
of claim represents a substantive proposition of fairness, not a mere
logical or conceptual correlation. This proposition is distorted, however, in the opinion of the majority on the court. Those who are
incapable of assuming obligations or responsibilities cannot be regarded as irresponsible and, thus, to have forfeited any claim to have
their rights respected. Hence, mental incompetents and new-born
infants, for example, presumably possess rights that we are bound to
respect, despite their inability to reciprocate. The law apparently
respects this moral proposition, because both mental incompetents
and new-born infants presumably possess, for example, the right not
to be deprived of life without due process of law, although they lack
the capacity for legal duties. If that is correct, then the majority's
decision is based on a false principle-an imaginary symmetry-and
its conclusion cannot be sustained.
If the argument thus far is right, and the majority's "symmetry"
proposition is mistaken, is the majority guilty of "an abuse of logic"?
That charge seems misleading or confused. Given the court's assumptions, its conclusion follows by the strictest logic. The dissenter is in no
position to claim it is an abuse of logic, because he accepts both the
majority's assumptions and its reasoning and only wishes to circumvent the proceeding by changing the law. If the decision is wrong, it is
wrong either because its premises are false, as suggested above, or, as
the dissenter urges, the decision is so objectionable that a responsible
court should take the law into its own hands and change it. Logic
itself, however, is neutral with respect to all these issues. Of course, it
might be imagined that the very quest for "symmetry" involves an
abuse of logic. But that would be mistaken-logic argues only for such
symmetries as logic guarantees. Because the sort of symmetry predicated by the majority involves a substantive point of fairness, which it
overextends, logic is silent on the matter.
Moreover, formalism as we understand it cannot be blamed for
the specific decision of the court in this case. Formalistic judges
assume that the law is determinate in all cases, and if they are
mistaken, they will read the law as determinate when in fact it is not.
Formalists, therefore, may stretch the legal facts, but this leads in no
particular direction. If one is going to discover illusory "symmetries"
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in the law, there is no telling what one might claim to find. The quest
for symmetry is too vague a basis for fixing formalistic judges in any
particular direction.
One might contend that the clash between formalist and instrumentalist judges is more social than theoretical. Formalism is often
characterized as politically and economically "conservative." It has
been associated with judicial decisions that secure the interests of the
economically powerful against those who suffer at their hands. The
trouble with this interpretation of formalism is that it has no causal
connection with the type of theory we have described. Some aspects of
our law tend to favor the powerful against those who would encroach
on their established rights, but other aspects tend to favor those whose
rights are violated by the rich and powerful. If formalism systematically favors one side over the other, that is not because it favors
symmetries or imagines the law to be more complete than it actually
is. Rather, it is because the individuals who compose that group are
biased and possibly dishonest, though perhaps as dishonest with themselves as with the community at large. This is not to deny that legal
battles reflect economic struggles, or that legal theory can be politically motivated. What the critics of formalism fail to demonstrate,
however, is that formalism is especially related to one side of these
battles, or that instrumentalism is especially related to the other side.
The instrumentalists' criticism of the imaginary decision discussed above is worth probing further, for such criticism appears
faithful to the instrumentalist tradition and reveals some difficulties
for its practitioners. The instrumentalist dissenter claims that "we as
judges can alter these concepts as we desire to serve useful goals." If
we take the dissenter at his word, his criticism has the following
implications: The majority's premise that capacity for rights assumes
capacity for duties is a true proposition of law; the court has the
capacity to make it false by changing the law; and such modification is
perfectly proper. Thus, on a literal level, the dissenter must be understood as arguing either that changing the law in order to serve useful
goals is authorized by law or that the court should act unlawfully. Assuming that instrumentalists do not typically call on courts to act unlawfully, we should probably understand them as supposing that the law
empowers courts to act as courts of equity. This is an interesting
proposition, but it may not be what is really meant; its literal meaning
readily can be doubted.
Recall our discussion of the formalistic model of legal justification, which, together with the source-based view of law, led to the idea
that law consists of whatever can be read from authorized texts or is
literally implied by them. I argued earlier that this cannot be assumed

1981]

FORMALISM AND INSTR UMENTALISM

to exhaust "the law," because an adequate account of what the law
requires and allows may take us beyond the four corners of its texts.
Hence, we can understand the idea of changing a legal concept (e.g., to
effect equity), which the dissenter prefers, in two ways: as a matter of
adjusting our understanding of the law by going beyond a doctrinaire
or literal reading of it (which may be inadequate), or as a matter of
changing law by neglecting some binding considerations or introducing others without adequate legal basis. If the latter is what the
instrumentalist dissenter has in mind, he is calling on the court to act
unlawfully. If he has the former notion in mind, however, then he
desires not so much a change in the law as a change in our understanding of it.
I doubt that the latter is the appropriate interpretation of the
dissenter's opinion; it would be more characteristic of an instrumentalist to maintain that the law on the subject is really indeterminate. In
that case, we cannot read the dissenting opinion literally. The dissenter does not believe that the court should "alter these concepts as
we desire to serve useful goals," but instead he believes that the law
needs to be shaped because it is not yet capable of deciding the case at
hand. Because he believes the court is engaged in a legislative activity
(which is not just a matter of correcting an inadequate understanding
of existing law), the dissenter urges the court to serve useful goals. If
that is what the dissenter means to say, then his criticism of the
majority opinion is poorly framed, at best.
In sum, if we take the instrumentalist at his word, he is urging
the court to ignore existing law and illegally change it. If we take him
in some other way suggested by his general position, then we find his
comments at best hyperbolic and unilluminating. As I believe that
Summers accurately captures the spirit and character of instrumentalist criticisms of formalistic legal practice, I must demur from his
appraisal of those criticisms. Very little legal method can be traced to
formalistic legal theory. Instrumentalist criticisms of judicial practices
seem themselves to suffer from overgeneralization and logical confusion. Furthermore, instrumentalists appear to embrace a naively utilitarian normative theory, and their recommendations concerning judicial legislation are, accordingly, unreliable.

If my original suspicions were sound, formalism is a nontheory,
developed by instrumentalists who see themselves as battling theoryladen judicial practice that ignores human values. Instrumentalism is
itself half-formed out of radical empiricism, developed on the verge of
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skepticism toward theory as well as substantive values, including those
with which it wishes to be identified. Ambivalence about theory,
values, and the law itself runs right through instrumentalism. This
makes that body of legal doctrine an accurate reflection of a significant
stream of American thought.

